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I. Introduction
F REEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, guaranteed to all Americans by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, is perhaps one of the most sacred and inviolable
rights ever possessed by any political segment of mankind; yet,
it has limitations. The great Justice Holmes circumscribed First
and, consequently, Fourteenth Amendment freedoms with the
invisible "clear and present danger" I limitation, which dis-
tinguishes free speech, religion and assembly from conduct
susceptible to criminal sanction. There is, then, a point at which
free conduct becomes criminal. We have chosen to discuss and
undertake to determine the precise point at which an assemblage
of persons engaged in a racial demonstration loses constitutional
protection and becomes instead an unlawful assembly, punish-
able as such under the common law or under state statutes or
ordinances which embody the common law.
To accomplish this purpose, we shall first attempt to define
the crime of "unlawful assembly"; then we shall discuss breach
of the peace because it is so intimately connected with the offense
of unlawful assembly. This article will conclude with examples
of situations in which racial demonstrations are, or are not, un-
lawful assemblies; for that purpose we will concern ourselves
with three types of racial demonstrations: (1) "sit-in" demonstra-
tions, (2) picketing of eating places, and (3) parades of armed
or unarmed demonstrators.
There are so many variations in the statutes of the several
states defining unlawful assembly and dealing with breach of
the peace that it would be impracticable to treat each of them in
this article. Therefore, our discussion will deal with the com-
mon law signification of these terms and with court decisions
concerning statutes and ordinances which comport with such
common law significations.
H. Unlawful Assembly
This article will deal with the common law offense of unlaw-
ful assembly as the same is defined in a recent Annotation at 71
A. L. R. 2d 875, 878, in which it is stated that said offense con-
sists of (1) the assembling together of three or more persons
(2) with a common design or intent (3) to accomplish a lawful or
unlawful purpose by means such as would give rational, firm, and
* Attorney General of Florida; immediate past President, National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General.
1 249 U. S. 47, at 52; 63 L. Ed. 470; 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1918).
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courageous persons in the neighborhood of the assembly a well-
grounded fear of a breach of the peace.2
In line with this definition was Blackstone's statement that
an assembly for the purpose of doing an unlawful act without
making any motion toward the execution of their purpose could
constitute the crime.3
Intent, the purpose or design in the minds of those making up
the assemblage, is all-important to the commission of the crime;
it need not exist, however, at the outset but may be formed
either at or after the time of the assembly, and its existence can
be inferred from language, acts, conduct and other circumstances
involved in the alleged unlawful assembly.4
In Redford v. Birley,5 an English decision rendered in 1822,
the jury was instructed that a large gathering of persons who
drilled with stones, bludgeons and other offensive weapons on a
field at Manchester was an unlawful assembly if the participants
met "in such a way as to overawe and terrify other persons .. .
In State v. Butterworth,6 a New Jersey decision, defendants
were convicted under a statute adopting the common-law crime
of unlawful assembly. During a strike by silk mill workers near
Patterson, New Jersey, the strikers attempted to hold a meeting
in Turn Hall to protest alleged police oppression against strikers.
Police refused to allow the meeting to be held in the Hall. To
protest this latest police action, 200 or 300 persons gathered in
the public square; a procession of about 30 marched from union
headquarters to the square, led by two young women bearing the
American flag and followed by the defendants. By the time the
procession had reached the city square, about 1,500 or 2,000 per-
sons had gathered. Defendant Butterworth began to address
the crowd saying, "Fellow workers," whereupon he was inter-
rupted by police officers, who asked if he had a permit to hold
a public meeting. Butterworth, holding up a book in his hand,
said, "This is my permit." He was placed under arrest, to which
he made no resistance but quietly submitted. There was no evi-
dence that any weapons were displayed at any time. Two police
officers testified that the attempted meeting put them in fear that
something might happen, but there was no evidence that any
other person was put in fear by the proceedings. The convictions
of Butterworth and others were under a statute which on appeal
was held to be to the same effect as the above quoted common
law definition of unlawful assembly.
2 See Annotation at 71 A. L. R. 2d 875, 878; State v. Butterworth, 104 N. J. L.
579, 142 A. 57, 59, 58 A. L. R. 744 (1928); Shields v. State, 187 Wis. 448, 204
N. W. 486, 487, 40 A. L. R. 945 (1925).
8 71 A. L. R. 2d 877.
4 Lair v. State, 316 P. 2d 225, at 234 & 235, 71 A. L. R. 2d 856 (Okla., 1957).
5 3 Starkie 76, 171 Eng. Reprint 773 (1822); see also 71 A. L. R. 2d 877.
6 Supra, note 2.
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On appeal, the convictions were reversed. In reversing, the
court, speaking through Justice Kalisch, remarked:
It is rather startling to the most lively imagination that, if
this meeting was of such a turbulent and disorderly character
as described in the indictment, unsupported as it is, how-
ever, by the proof, that out of 40 policemen only 2 of them,
and they without stating any facts reasonably supporting any
ground of fear or alarm which would be entertained by a
person of a firm and courageous mind, were seized with fear
of a threatened outbreak and breach of the public peace ....
. . . [The] object of the meeting was to protest publicly
against action taken by the police authorities which pre-
vented the strikers from holding their meetings to vent their
grievances in a public hall. The object of the meeting, there-
fore, was per se not an unlawful one, and an indictment for
unlawful assembly could not properly be predicated upon
the mere fact of holding the meeting in a public place . . .7
A Puerto Rican case, Garcia Dominicci v. District Court,"
and a Wisconsin case, Shields v. State,9 will also show what type
of assembly is protected by the Constitution. In the former,
defendants and other students constituting a throng of 500
gathered together and marched toward the University of Puerto
Rico to protest certain acts of the Chancellor of the school. They
made noises, including whistling, jeering and uttering boisterous
exclamations; and their conduct obstructed traffic. Police tried
to change their course to prevent them from approaching the
school and to ease traffic conditions; but the demonstrators dis-
regarded police demands, continuing to march upon the Univer-
sity. Later most of the paraders sat in the street and on side-
walks, completely paralyzing traffic for about half an hour.
The defendants were convicted under an unlawful assembly
statute requiring violent and tumultuous conduct. The court
utilized the Butterworth case's definition of unlawful assembly
in construing the statute. The convictions were reversed. The
decision reads in part:
The nature of each act depends on the circumstances under
which it was executed. Perhaps if this very act had been
executed in a peaceful hamlet whose inhabitants were not
used to the excitement and noises, its peace and order might
be disturbed. But the events took place in the city of Rio
Piedras, which is the seat of the University of Puerto Rico,
with more than 5,000 students. .. 0
7 Id. at 142 A. 61.
8 71 Puerto Rico 122 (1950).
9 Supra, note 2.
10 Supra, note 8, at p. 126.
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... [T]he right of the people to assemble for redress of
grievances may only be sacrificed when public order is
actually threatened and not merely when it is conceivable
that it may be slightly affected."
The decision seems to point out the importance of "climate" and
circumstances surrounding each alleged crime of unlawful
assembly. Latin temperament is excitable and easily aroused;
what is commonplace in a university city in Puerto Rico may
create riots and be punishable as unlawful assembly in Boston
or in a non-university town in Puerto Rico, for that matter. If
the students involved had all been members of one race and
had conducted their demonstration in a town torn by racial
strife, the holding of the court might have been contra.
The Wisconsin decision, Shields v. State,12 concerned a Ku
Klux Klan parade, consisting of men and women in regulation
regalia of masks and long robes, marching through the streets of
a Wisconsin city before a crowd of six or seven thousand people
assembled to watch. The parade was conducted in an orderly
manner; the participants marched with folded arms and neither
said nor did anything to cause any disorder. A question decided
by the court was whether this parade could be considered an un-
lawful assembly. Wisconsin, at that time, evidently had no unlaw-
ful assembly statute and the court applied the common-law defi-
nition.
The parade was held not to be an unlawful assembly and
from the decision, we glean the following relevant comments:
. . . [T]he conduct of the participants was perfectly order-
ly; they marched with their arms folded across their breasts;
and they behaved in every respect in the most peaceful man-
ner. There was nothing in their conduct to give rise to a
reasonable belief that they would, or even intended to, "dis-
turb the peace tumultuously." It might be argued that be-
cause of the proclaimed principles of this organization, which
are exceedingly offensive to certain classes of American citi-
zens, the presence of its members, clothed in their regalia,
might provoke those classes of American citizens who are
proscribed by its tenets to a breach of the peace. It cannot be
doubted that the public demonstrations of this order excite
resentment on the part of those classes of our citizens whose
Americanism the principles of the order condemn. But ex-
perience in our state does not indicate that such resentment,
justly entertained, prompts reprisal by acts of violence, or
leads to a tumultuous breach of the peace . . .13 (Emphasis
supplied.)
11 Id. at 127, 128.
12 Supra, note 2.
13 Id. at 204 N. W. 487.
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Now let us turn our attention to a case in which convictions
for unlawful assembly were upheld. In People v. Anderson,14
a California case, the defendants were all members of a Com-
munist organization known as the Trades Union Unity League.
This League called a "demonstration against unemployment," to
be held in the Plaza, which was a public square or park in the
City of Los Angeles. Large crowds were gathered on all the
streets in this vicinity in places blocking the sidewalks and even
the roadways. Defendants were all members of the League, and
had all come to take part in the demonstration or to speak.
One defendant was raised on the shoulders of other defend-
ants. He began to speak; he shouted, and the crowd shouted back.
Police officers started toward him and had to fight their way
through the crowd. The speaker shouted, "Don't let the police
disperse us, don't let them arrest our speakers, fight against un-
employment." The noise was so great that the police could not
hear all that was said. When the police reached the defendants,
they told them to disperse, that they were disturbing the peace
and blocking traffic. The defendant refused to get down and the
police proceeded to make arrests, in spite of resistance by all
defendants.
Other defendants tried the same tactics at different locations,
but not all such groups resisted the police, as did the first
assemblage. Convictions of all the defendants were upheld,
under an unlawful assembly statute. We quote from the opinion:
... The defendants . . . were all acting in concert and
with a common purpose in so assembling, . . . [W]hatever
was done by any one of them was in furtherance of their
common design, and hence . . . all were equally respon-
sible criminally for the acts of any of them . . .',
Next the court stated that one of the purposes of the assembly
was to resist by force any attempt to arrest or disperse them and
to commit a disturbance of the peace; and that some of the defend-
ants went further than others in executing this unlawful purpose,
but that their guilt did not depend on the consummation of the
purpose by all, or even by any, of them. The defendants had
evidently argued that they had merely been resisting unlawful
arrests. Apparently the court considered the gist of the offenses
to be that defendants refused to move or quit speaking when
warned by police that they were blocking traffic. The court said:
. . . While a speaker who is not himself obstructing traffic
may not always be criminally responsible for such obstruc-
tion created by his hearers, yet when he refuses to move on
request and insists on holding his meeting at a place where
his hearers are blocking traffic, as in this case, he becomes at
14 1 P. 2d 65 (Superior Court, Appellate Department, California, 1931).
15 Id. at 67.
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least an aider and abettor, and a principal in the offense
10
III. Breach of the Peace
A breach of the peace is a violation of public order; the
offense of disturbing the public peace. The term is generic, and
includes riotous and unlawful assemblies. 17 Here are the neces-
sary elements of the common law offense: (1) conduct, actions or
words, (2) which are voluntary, willful, intentional, unjustifiable
and calculated to disturb public order or tranquillity, 5 (3) which
arouse and disturb some segment of the public,10 and (4) which
constitute violence or directly and immediately 20 provoke or tend
to provoke actual or threatened violence.
21
Disturbing and arousing the public does not mean causing
mere discomfort, annoyance or resentment; rather, defendant's
acts, words or conduct must be such as normally cause alarm,
consternation, disquiet and disorder, and which threaten danger
or disaster.22 Actual violence is not a necessary element of the
offense; either actual or threatened violence is sufficient to con-
stitute the offense. In cases not involving open disturbances in
public places, and the actual annoyance of the public at large,
personal violence, either actual or threatened, is required before
a crime has been committed. 23 Actual personal violence is never
a requirement. There must be at least threatened personal
violence to constitute non-public breaches of the peace, but if the
acts, conduct or words affect a larger segment of the public, the
necessity for personal violence disappears in inverse proportion
with the increasingly public nature of the environ of the alleged
acts, words or conduct.24 The acts, words or conduct cannot be
criminal unless they tend with sufficient directness to break the
peace. By directness is meant an immediate threat to public
safety, peace or order; a mere possibility that the act, conduct or
16 Id. at 68.
17 Stewart v. State, 4 Okl. Cr. 564, 109 P. 243, 245 (1910).
18 State v. Mancini, 91 Vt. 507, 101 A. 581 (1917); People v. Sustek, et al.,
124 N. Y. S. 2d 641 (1953).
19 Stancliff v. United States, 5 Ind. T. 486, 82 S. W. 882 (1904); People v.
Perry, et al., 265 N. Y. 362, 193 N. E. 175 (1934).
20 State v. Steger, 94 W. Va. 576, 119 S. E. 682, 34 A. L. R. 570 (1923); State
v. Thompson, 117 Vt. 70, 84 A. 2d 594 (1951); Webber v. Farmers Chevrolet
Co., et al., 186 S. C. 111, 195 S. E. 139 (1938).
21 Woods v. State, 152 Cr. 338, 213 S. W. 2d 685 (Tex., 1948); Wanzer v.
State, 202 Md. 601, 97 A. 2d 914 (1953); State ex rel. Thompson, Atty. Gen.
v. Reichman, 135 Tenn. 685, 188 S. W. 597 (1916).
22 People v. Ludovici, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 88 (1939); People v. Chesnick, 302
N. Y. 58, 96 N. E. 2d 87 (1950).
23 Ware v. Loveridge, 75 Mich. 488, 42 N. W. 997 (1889); State ex rel.
Thompson, Atty. Gen. v. Reichman, supra, note 21.
24 Ibid.
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words may produce or incite violence is not sufficient to con-
stitute a breach of the peace.2 5 Whether or not a given act or
state of conduct amounts to a breach of the peace depends upon
the circumstances surrounding the act,26 what may amount to a
punishable offense in one set of circumstances may not be a
breach of the peace in another time, place, and situation.
A. The Cantwell and Feiner Cases
Two United States Supreme Court cases in particular have
clarified the demarcation line separating First Amendment free-
doms from conduct constituting a breach of the peace; they are
Cantwell v. Connecticut27 and Feiner v. New York.2s In the
former, the defendant, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect,
was convicted of the common law offense of "inciting a breach of
the peace." While on a street in a predominantly Catholic neigh-
borhood, he stopped two men who were Catholics. He asked and
received permission to play a phonograph record and then pro-
ceeded to play the record, which attacked the Catholic religion.
Both men were incensed by the playing of the record and were
tempted to do violence to Cantwell. They told him to go away,
and on being so advised, he left their presence without being
argumentative.
The conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court. Cant-
well had been on a public street, "where he had a right to be,
and where he had a right peacefully to impart his views to
others."29 The court pointed out that the playing of the record
had not disturbed nearby residents and that it had not attracted
a crowd or impeded traffic; the fact that the hearers had been
highly offended and angered was not sufficient to make the
actions criminal. The court observed that conduct, words or acts
likely to provoke violence can be a breach of the peace, even if
no such eventuality be intended and had the following to say
with reference to breach of the peace:
S. . [I]n practically all [breach of the peace cases], the
provocative language which was held to amount to a breach
of the peace consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive re-
marks directed to the person of the hearer. Resort to
epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense com-
munication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution . . .30 (Parentheses supplied.)
25 State v. Thompson, supra, note 20; State v. Steger, supra, note 20.
26 Jennings v. State, 92 0. Cr. 347, 223 P. 2d 562 (Okla., 1950); State v.
Stroble, 169 Kan. 167, 217 P. 2d 1073 (1950); State v. Mancini, supra, note 18.
27 310 U. S. 296, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 128 A. L. R. 1352 (1939).
28 340 U. S. 315, 95 L. Ed. 267, 71 Sup. Ct. 303 (1950).
29 Supra, note 27 at 310 U. S. 308.
30 Id. at 309, 310.
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We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily
harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no
personal abuse .. .31
The court opined that Cantwell could not be said to have com-
mitted a breach of the peace in the absence of a statute narrowly
drawn to define and punish conduct as constituting a clear and
present danger.
A decision which may have great influence upon future cases
regarding racial demonstrations is Feiner v. New York.3 2 De-
fendant was arrested under a statute which substantially em-
bodied the common law offense of breach of the peace, with some
variations.3 3 Feiner, the defendant, made a speech at a busy
intersection in the City of Syracuse. He spoke from a box located
between the sidewalk and the street. A crowd of 75 to 80 (mixed
colored and white) persons gathered around him, and some
pedestrians had to go into the street in order to pass by. Two
policemen observed the meeting. Feiner indicated in an excited
manner that Negroes did not have equal rights and should rise
up in arms. One man indicated that if the police did not get the
speaker off the stand, he would do it himself. The crowd, which
consisted of both those who opposed and those who supported
the speaker, was restless. There was not yet a disturbance but
the arresting officer stepped in to prevent it from resulting in a
fight. Having ignored two police requests to stop speaking, Feiner
was arrested. The United States Supreme Court, in an extremely
close decision upheld the conviction, saying:
... The courts below . . . found Ihat the officers in making
the arrest were motivated solely by a proper concern for
the preservation of order and protection of the general
welfare, and that there was no evidence which could lend
color to a claim that the acts of the police were a cover for
suppression of petitioner's views and opinions. Petitioner
was thus neither arrested nor convicted for the making or
the content of his speech. Rather, it was the reaction which
it actually engendered. 34
31 Id. at 310.
32 Supra, note 28.
33 Section 722 of the Penal Law of New York:
"Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or
whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the
following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of dis-
orderly conduct:
"1. Uses offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language,
conduct or behavior;
"2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct,
or be offensive to others;
"3. Congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move on
when ordered by the police; . .. ."
34 Supra, note 28 at 340 U. S. 319, 320.
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• . . This Court respects, as it must, the interest of the
community in maintaining peace and order on its streets.
[giving citations]. We cannot say that the preservation of
that interest here encroaches on the constitutional rights of
this petitioner."5
We are well aware that the ordinary murmurings and objec-
tions of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence
a speaker, and are also mindful of the possible danger of giv-
ing overzealous police officials complete discretion to break
up otherwise lawful public meetings. "A State may not
unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or
other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions."
Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, (310 U. S. at 308 ... )
. . . But we are not faced here with such a situation. It is
one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instru-
ment for the suppression of unpopular views, and another
to say that, when as here the speaker passes the bounds of
argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot,
they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace . . .
The findings of the state courts as to the existing situation
and the imminence of greater disorder coupled with peti-
tioner's deliberate defiance of the police officers convince us
that we should not reverse this conviction in the name of free
speech.3
B. Refusal to Leave Private Property as a Breach of the Peace
Under the common law, if A, while lawfully on the private
property of B, is asked by B to leave, and A refuses to so do,
B may have the right to forcibly remove A or to obtain police aid
in removing A; but if A sits quietly and engages in no offensive
conduct other than quiet refusal to leave, the courts find dif-
ficulty in construing such conduct of A to be a breach of the
peace.
In a 1947 New York decision, People v. Swald, 7 rendered by
the City Court of Utica, Swald, an independent taxicab driver,
was told to stop soliciting customers in the Union Station, which
was private property of the railroad. He disregarded the warn-
ing and came back to solicit customers. A police officer told him
to leave. He would not go, however, and was placed under arrest
for disorderly conduct, one of the necessary elements of which
was language, conduct or behavior intended to provoke a breach
of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned.
The court held that no offense was committed, saying:
35 Id. at 320.
36 Id. at 320, 321.
37 73 N. Y. S. 2d 399 (1947).
Jan., 1961
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1961
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
. . . [D]efendant's actions caused no crowd to collect nor
was any loud, offensive, insulting or disturbing language or
conduct employed by the defendant.38
It is understandable that the refusal of the defendant to
leave the premises was annoying, disturbing and perhaps
offensive to the complainant as well as interference with the
property rights of the New York Central Railroad. It may
well be that defendant was a trespasser on the premises and
could have been removed by force if necessary .. .
It has not been shown in this case that the defendant had any
intention of breaching the peace. The record discloses no
loud or angry talk, no boisterous or profane language, no
physical violence or threat to do so . ..39
Thus, annoying, disturbing or offensive conduct does not
necessarily in and of itself provoke a breach of the peace. Vio-
lence, either actual or threatened, is necessary.
C. Picketing as a Breach of the Peace
Peaceful picketing is not per se unlawful nor a breach of the
peace; however, if carried on for an unlawful purpose, or if
accompanied by threats, force, violence, coercion or intimidation,
it enjoys no immunity.40 Also, pickets may not violate traffic
regulations; a person could not, for instance, take "his stand in
the middle of a crowded street . . . and maintain his position
to the stoppage of all traffic; a group . .. could not insist upon
a constitutional right to form a cordon across the street and to
allow no pedestrian to pass who did not accept a tendered leaf-
let. . ... ,41
In People v. Kieran,42 a New York County Court case, de-
fendants who were members of a religious sect walked along the
sidewalk in single file, at intervals of ten feet, bearing placards
with such words as "Religion is a snare and a racket." No vio-
lence occurred and none was threatened though curious people
followed the marchers. The defendants were arrested under New
York statute for the crime of "disorderly conduct," which contains
many of the elements of, but is broader in scope than, the com-
mon-law offense of breach of the peace. They were found not
guilty. Here is what the court said:
38 Id. at 400.
39 Id. at 401.
40 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940);
Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 84 L. Ed. 1104, 60 Sup. Ct. 746, reh. den.
310 U. S. 657, 84 L. Ed. 1420, 60 Sup. Ct. 1072 (1940); Moore v. City Dry
Cleaners and Laundry, 41 So. 2d 865 (Fla., 1949).
41 Nichols v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 147, 160, 84 L. Ed:
155, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1941).
42 26 N. Y. S. 2d 291 (1940).
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• . . [I]n the instant case is presented the question whether
the acts of the defendants passed beyond lawful exercise
of constitutional rights and into the range of "disorderly
conduct . . . . 43
. . . They . . . [defendants] . . . exercising their in-
dividual freedom of thought, are convinced that "truth" is in
the Bible alone and not in organized religion . . . I think
that the Constitution and bill of rights are intended to and
do guarantee to them the right to do that very thing. .... 44
We may well say that these defendants, in the manner
in which they exercised their rights, were guilty of lack of
manners and of bad taste, but those errors are not to be
corrected by convictions for disorderly conduct . . . No
violence occurred and none was threatened . . .
Several other decisions deserve our attention. Another New
York case, People v. Barkal,46 decided in 1942 in the City Magis-
trate's Court of New York City, involved arrests for disorderly
conduct of persons who had failed to move their picket line of
march around a Coney Island lunch room and sidewalk counter
restaurant, when ordered to do so by police. The picketing was
being conducted around an oval march pattern extending the
length of the building, with the strikers circling around to the
center of the twenty-five foot wide sidewalk, while remaining 6
to 8 feet from the building at all times. Police had demanded that
picketing be confined to an area on the sidewalk 5 feet from the
curb. The defendants refused to so restrict their activities.
No offense was committed, the court held. "Picketing is not
a game nor a sport. It is engaged in by people seeking to improve
their working conditions and their standards of living. 4' Picket-
ing is freedom of speech, and, said the court, its use in cases of
conflicting economic, social and political interests may cause
temporary inconvenience. This incidental inconvenience, how-
ever, is not justification for the limitation of the constitutional
right to picket. 48 The opinion then reads:
It follows, therefore, that the defendants as strikers had a
right, under all the circumstances, to picket in or about the
center of the sidewalk, in order to convey the information
they desired to disseminate to the public in the immediate
vicinity. The order of the Police Department limiting the
picketing to five feet from the curb was arbitrary, unreason-
43 Id. at 306.
44 Id. at 308.
45 Id. at 308, 309.
46 36 N. Y. S. 2d 1011 (1942).
47 Id. at 1014.
48 Id. at 1015.
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able and capricious. It constituted a flagrant invasion and
deprivation of the constitutional rights of the pickets.49
In the Colorado Supreme Court case of Flores, et al. by City
& County of Denver,50 the following pertinent facts appear: Fifty
to seventy people, including the defendants, assembled in front
of the Governor's house and chanted in high-pitched voices for a
redress of certain grievances. There was no profanity or fighting
and police received no complaints from neighbors that they were
being disturbed. The chief of police observed the proceedings for
ten minutes. Then he requested that the group disperse. The
defendants insisted upon the right to demonstrate for fifteen more
minutes, to which the chief of police reiterated his demand for
immediate dispersal. The defendants refused to comply and
were placed under arrest, for, among other things, violation of a
"disturbing the peace of others" ordinance. The court held there
was no crime committed. It said that the conduct of the defend-
ants was neither violent nor threatening, nor likely to produce
violence, or cause consternation and alarm. No one was disturbed,
so there could be no "disturbance" of the peace. "Even if the
ordinance be construed to include breach of the peace generally,
there must be at least a threat to the peace of the community." 51
The court obviously felt that the conduct of the defendants could
not constitute a common law beach of the peace. The court dis-
cussed breach of the peace cases involving fighting and unlawful
activities, then said:
In the situation here presented, we have another element,
absent from the cases hereinabove noted. The disturbance of
which complaint was made in those cases was wanton and
without worthy purpose. In the instant case, the noise in-
volved was incidental to a legitimate right, protected by the
Constitution, to appeal to those in authority for redress of
grievance by remonstrance, and such right must be balanced
against the right of the community to peace and quiet. There
exists the undoubted authority of the state reasonably to
limit the free exercise of the right of remonstrance, as well
as of the free exercise of religion, and even of the right of free
speech itself, where they sanction incitement to riot or
constitute an immediate threat to public safety, peace or
order, but such rights may not be lightly nor unduly sup-
pressed .... 52
People v. Nixson (1928, New York Court of Appeals) 53
49 Ibid.
50 122 Colo. 71, 220 P. 2d 373 (1950).
51 Id. at 220 P. 2d 375.
52 Id. at 376.
53 248 N. Y. 182, 161 N. E. 463 (1928).
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involved several appeals from disorderly conduct convictions
resulting from a picketing demonstration; some convictions were
upheld while others were reversed, the reason seeming to be that
the former group, prior to being arrested, were admonished by
police to discontinue marching in large groups, and failed to heed
the warning. Those whose convictions were reversed, although
engaging in identical conduct, had not been so admonished. All
defendants had picketed or marched in mass formation on a side-
walk, thereby obstructing it and causing some pedestrians to use
the roadway. They had been parading four abreast and occupied
approximately 6 feet of a 12 foot sidewalk.
The court, among other things, mentioned that the mere fact
that persons congregating or walking in the streets cause incon-
venience to others or cause pedestrians to stand aside or step into
the roadway does not necessarily tend to a breach of the peace.
The court went on to say that the social or economic position of
defendants should have no bearing on the question of whether
conduct is innocent or wrongful. As to those defendants who
were not forewarned by the police, the court said:
... In the absence of evidence that the defendants caused
substantial annoyance to others, or persisted in their conduct
after protest from others or warning from a police officer, we
find the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction. .... 54
However:
. . . In the other four cases the circumstances are different.
There the evidence, though meager and unsatisfactory, yet
seems to us sufficient to support a finding that the defendants
acted recklessly of the rights and convenience of others, and
that their conduct tended to a breach of the peace.
In all these four cases there is evidence that before the de-
fendants were arrested they were warned by police officers
that they must not persist in marching up and down the street
in large groups. Police officers are guardians of the public
order. Their duty is not merely to arrest offenders, but to
protect persons from threatened wrong and to prevent dis-
order. In the performance of their duties they may give
reasonable directions. Present at the point where the de-
fendants were congregating they might early sense the
possibility of disorder.
Even a protest from pedestrians who were annoyed by the
defendants' conduct might be a significant element in deter-
mining whether persistence in such conduct was wrongful.
Enough has been shown in these cases to justify the officers
in warning the defendants. Refusal to heed the warning so
given, persistence in parading the street in groups thereafter,
is, perhaps, so significant of a contumacious disregard of the
54 Id. at 161 N. E. 466.
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rights of others that it supports the finding of guilt of the
defendants. In these cases the judgments must be affirmed.55
IV. When do Racial Demonstrations Become Unlawful
Assemblies?
We already have seen that the common law offense of unlaw-
ful assembly is not committed unless the defendants can be
shown to have intent to accomplish a lawful or unlawful purpose
by means which would cause persons in the neighborhood to fear
a breach of the peace.56 They must, of course, act in concert
with intent to effectuate a common purpose or design, before
such act becomes criminal.57 The right to demonstrate for the
purpose of seeking a redress of grievances is not to be lightly or
unduly suppressed. 58 However, there can be no doubt that if
such demonstration takes on the characteristics or elements of the
common law crime of unlawful assembly, the demonstrators will
be guilty of that offense.
A. "Sit-in" Demonstrations
The recent wave of restaurant "sit-ins" in the South raises
new and important questions. The concern of the law in such
instances must be not only with individual constitutional rights,
but also with the property rights of the restaurant owner. Peace-
ful "sit-in" demonstrations are lawful and cannot constitute a
breach of the peace or unlawful assembly no matter how much
antagonism and resentment they cause except in the following
types of situations:
(1) The demonstrators, to the disturbance of some segment
of the public, engage in some form of violence, profanity, in-
decency, abusiveness or discourtesy, which under the common
law would constitute or create in others a reasonable fear of a
breach of the peace, provided that the other elements of the
common law crime of unlawful assembly are also present;
(2) Bystanders gathering to watch the "sit-in" demonstrators
become agitated to such extent as to create a clear and present
danger of a riot or breach of the peace and the demonstrators,
although previously innocent of wrong-doing, refuse to disperse
upon demand of authorities. It is true that if the bystanders be-
come abusive, profane, violent, or if their conduct tends to pro-
voke violence, then they have committed crimes. It is also true
that the duty of police officers is to protect the demonstrators in
the exercise of their constitutional right to seek a redress of griev-
55 Ibid.
56 Supra, note 2.
57 Supra, notes 2 & 4.
58 Supra, note 50, at 220 P. 2d 376.
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ances, but this does not mean that demonstrators may insist upon
exercising that right when to do so creates imminent danger of
a riot or a breach of the peace. The mere fact that the demonstra-
tion causes resentment among bystanders, of course, cannot make
the "sit-in" illegal. Nevertheless, if the demonstrators refuse to
desist from conduct which, although lawful under ordinary cir-
cumstances, tends to create an imminent danger of a riot or a
breach of the peace, then we think that the Feiner59 decision
would justify their arrest.
B. Picketing
Peaceful picketing which does not unduly block traffic is
constitutionally protected unless and until it becomes violent or
otherwise constitutes a breach of the peace. The illustration
above concerning bystanders at "sit-ins" is equally applicable to
picketing. The cases involving picketing already mentioned are,
of course, equally applicable whether the demonstration is by
laborers seeking higher wages and better working conditions or
by Negroes striking for greater voice in social, economic and
political affairs. The Nixson0 0 case, above discussed, although a
much older case, seems to apply to the field of picketing the legal
principles enunciated in the Feiner decision.
C. Parades
A parade is merely an assemblage in motion. The rules apply-
ing to "sit-in" and picketing demonstrations, apply to parades as
well. In addition, the old English case of Redford v. Birley,6 1 in
which common law principles were applied, points out that a
group of men drilling or marching with sticks, guns, clubs or
other offensive weapons, may be guilty of unlawful assembly if
the participants meet in such a way as to "overawe and terrify"
other persons.
V. Conclusion
It should be pointed out that the circumstances surrounding
any act are of prime importance in determining whether the crime
of unlawful assembly has been cormnitted.6 2 Conduct constituting
the crime in a city beset by race disturbances might not be
punishable if committed in some other setting. Probably the law
enforcement officials of a tradition-steeped southern community
or of a crowded northern city are faced with potential race riots
and disorders of much greater magnitude and of more explosive
potential than are sheriffs and police officers in localities where
59 Supra, note 28.
60 Supra, note 53.
61 Supra, note 5.
62 Supra, note 8.
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race problems are negligible; accordingly officials in the first
mentioned areas may justifiably sense danger from racial demon-
strations and take action to disperse them sooner than if they
were in localities of the latter type; and, although doubtless many
will disagree, we think that law enforcement officers in the first-
mentioned types of localities would be justified in making arrests
under circumstances where arrests might not be justified in areas
of the last-mentioned type.
Racial demonstrations for the purpose of promoting or
opposing the full exercise of "civil rights" of individuals will no
doubt raise many complex and novel legal questions in the near
and continuing future. As for the criminal law aspect of such
demonstrations, the best and most worthwhile observation that
can be made at this point is that there will be disorder and
chaos indefinitely unless demonstrators are arrested, if at all, only
on an impartial and strictly legal basis; that is to say, the law
must be the paramount consideration of police and judges.
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